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Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential 
relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly 
infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, 
Peirce’s semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a 
mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an 
infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. 
However, the prospects for Peirce’s infinitism depend entirely on the 
prospects for Peirce’s early semantics, which are not good. Peirce 
himself revised the semantic theory later, and in so doing, it seems 
also his epistemic infinitism.  
 
 
1. 
 
On the classical conception of knowledge, in order to know, you’ve got not only 
to believe something, what you believe has got to be true, and you’ve got to 
have a good reason as for why you believe it is true. But how do you know 
that’s a good reason? It itself has not only got to be true, but you’ve got to have 
another reason for why you hold it is. And then for that reason, another. Then 
another. Then we’re off to the races.  
Virtually nobody thinks we should run that very long race. There is a 
variety of theories of how to shorten the distance. Foundationalism is the thesis 
that we may stop giving reasons with a special set of beliefs called basic beliefs. 
Coherentism is the thesis that at a certain level of reason-giving, we may stop 
when the beliefs in question have a special fit with the rest (or some set) of our 
beliefs. Contextualism is the thesis that we may stop with beliefs appropriate for 
the given circumstances. Externalism is a rejection of the requirement that 
subjects need to give or be aware of further reasons when they obtain.  
Examples of philosophers and whole traditions abound for each of these 
theories of ways to leave off giving reasons, and it is easy to find many prime 
examples of and extended exchanges between these traditions. But it is difficult 
to find real examples of the tradition that we might call infinitist, those 
committed to the thesis that reasons may iterate infinitely. The old Pyrrhonean 
skeptical tradition has a version of accepting infinitism as a requirement on 
knowledge, but thereby they reject the project of knowing. This seems to be a 
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plausible reading of the Agrippan modes and Sextus’ use of them, but it is not a 
satisfying epistemological theory, since we are here looking for a theory of 
justification that dovetails with a theory of actual human knowledge.1 In 
passing, Peirce is mentioned as a candidate for holding the theory, but little 
more is said. Recently, Peter Klein (1999, 2000, and 2004) Jeremy Fantl (2003) 
and I (2005 and 2008) have argued for the view, and they have not only given 
accounts of the view’s intelligibility but also its resistance to traditional 
arguments against it. 
In light of these new developments in articulating and defending 
infinitism, I will retrieve the question as to whether Peirce was an epistemic 
infinitist. This is for two reasons. First, it is important that we have an adequate 
textual backing for these classifications, even if they are tentative and little 
hangs on them for current epistemological theorizing. We are scholars, and we 
should get it right. Second, in pursuing another example of a philosophical view, 
we might deepen and broaden our conception of it. Peirce’s work is innovative 
in a number of areas, and it stands to reason that his views relevant to current 
issues in metaepistemology will be helpful. 
I will argue for the following: First, that Peirce is explicitly infinitist in 
his early work, namely the 1868 series of articles, “Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” “Consequences of Four Incapacities,” and 
“The Grounds of Validity.”2 Second, that Peirce’s phenomenology of the 
relations between firsts, seconds, and thirds favors an interpretation of Peirce’s 
infinitism as a mixed theory of justification, where infinite series of inferences 
are also supported by non-cognitive input from seconds. The conclusion, then, is 
that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure 
infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce’s infinitism depend entirely on the 
prospects for his early semiotics, which are not good. Peirce himself revised the 
semiotic theory later, and in so doing, it seems also the motives for his epistemic 
infinitism. 
 
2. 
 
Broadly, epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential 
relations are necessary for epistemic justification. The view may be construed as 
exceedingly demanding in that it may be an exclusivist thesis regarding sources 
of justification – namely that only these series are productive of justification. 
Such would be a pure infinitism, as is exemplary in Klein’s 1999 and Fantl’s 
2003, where all the standing alternatives are shown insufficient against the 
backdrop of criteria for a sufficient theory of justification.3  
The model for successful justification for pure infinitism is that of an 
infinite chain of justifying relations between commitments. However, infinitism 
may alternately be a mixed theory of justification, so that it is an ecumenical 
take on sources of justification. Mixed theories of justification are not exclusive 
with regard to what sources are allowable for epistemic justification, so, for 
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example, Susan Haack’s foundherentism makes room for both direct 
justification and justification from coherence (1993).  
For impure infinitism, these series are productive of justification, but they 
are not the only sources, and they may work in tandem with other sources of 
justification. The model for infinitism on an impure theory would be an 
infinitely long chain of reasons supported by direct epistemic support at various 
nodes. Such support itself need not be infallible, and, in fact, precisely because 
of its fallibility, it must be supplemented by further reasons. Such would be an 
impure infinitism, as is exemplary in my own 2005 and 2008. The core of the 
infinitist view, however, is the same: the response to the regress problem is that 
of having reasons on to infinity. 
An epistemic infinitism is at work in Peirce’s famous 1868 Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy series “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed 
For Man” and “Consequences of Four Incapacities.” Peirce’s main purpose is to 
show that all cognitions are inferential, not immediate or intuitional. At first, 
Peirce seems sympathetic to the issues motivating the foundationalist-intuitionist 
program in the regress problem. Question 7 of the “Questions” essay is whether 
there are any cognitions not determined by previous cognitions. In short, are 
there intuitions? Peirce notes that: 
 
It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are in possession of 
cognitions, which are all determined by previous ones and these by 
cognitions earlier still, there must have been a first in this series or else 
our state of cognition at anytime is completely determined according to 
logical laws, by our state at a previous time (CP 5.259). 
 
But he then notes: 
 
But there are many facts against this last supposition.... [It] is impossible 
to know intuitively that a given cognition is not determined by a previous 
one, the only way in which this can be known is by hypothetic inference 
from observed facts (CP 5.260 emphasis in the original). 
 
The Peircean definition of intuitions on the semiotic theory is that they are signs 
that refer immediately to their objects. The epistemic corollary is that an 
intuition is a “premiss not itself a conclusion” (5.213).  
The question of determination of one thought by another, though, 
complicates the matter, since these determinations may be semiotic, epistemic, 
or merely causal in nature. I will take it here that so long as Peirce’s arguments 
are that these semiotic determinations are interpretive, they are jointly causal 
and epistemic. Call this the dual role of semiotic interpretation: the reasons one 
has for an interpretation are both explanations for how one arrived at an 
interpretation and justifications for that interpretation. 
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Peirce further refines his notion of an intuition such that intuitions are (i) 
first cognitions determinable by logical laws (5.259), (ii) premises not 
themselves conclusions (5.213), and (iii) something about which it can be a 
question as to whether they are intuitions, even if one has them (5.260). Peirce 
synthesized the semiotic features of such judgments (their inferential role as 
antecedents to chains of further inferences) with their epistemic features (the 
justification one has in having them and the justification they confer through 
inference). So the question of the regress problem is whether there can be 
immediate reference to something that both gives a cognition its content and its 
epistemic status as an immediately justified belief.  
Peirce’s requirement for immediate reference is that if reference is 
immediate, it must be immediate that it is immediate. That is, we must 
intuitively know when we have intuitions. Let us call this the meta-requirement. 
So the difference between intuitive and non-intuitive knowledge itself must be 
intuitive.4 Peirce frames the argument for the requirement as such: 
 
[I]t is plainly one thing to have an intuition and another to know 
intuitively that it is an intuition, and the question is whether these two 
things, distinguishable in thought, are, in fact, invariably connected, so 
that we can always intuitively distinguish between an intuition and a 
cognition determined by another.(5.214) 
 
Peirce, then, from his conception of cognition, derives the following argument 
that intuitions and their immediate knowability as intuitions are connected:  
 
[A]ll the cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently 
their products are relations. But a cognition of a relation is determined by 
previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previous cognition 
can be known. It (intuition) does not exist, then, first, because it is 
absolutely incognizable, and second, because cognition exists so far as it 
is known. (5.262) 
 
Peirce’s first case is that, given that there has been (up to Peirce’s time and up to 
now, too) debate about what is intuitive knowledge and not (the rationalism-
empiricism debate, the current arguments against consciousness), it seems clear, 
on the meta-requirement, that such intuitions do not obtain. Additionally, given 
the meta-requirement, for the second-order-intuition to be intuitive, we would 
need a third intuition, and a fourth for that. As a consequence, it would be 
unclear how intuitions could solve the regress problem at all, since their 
introduction yields a new meta-regress.5  
Clearly, Peirce’s argument here depends crucially on the meta-
requirement for intuitions. We get an extended argument for the meta-
requirement and the conception of cognition behind it in the 1868 sequel to the 
“Questions” paper, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” The thesis of the 
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paper is that all mental events are results of the manipulation of signs. Thoughts 
are combinational; they, to be thoughts at all, must be well-formed-formulae, 
and the model for the movements of thought must be that of valid inference (CP 
6.338).  
The components of these formulae are signs: feelings, images, emotions, 
representations. For these thoughts to have content and for them to be of 
something, they must not only be well-formed, but they must be meant (CP 
5.289). How thoughts have intentionality, on this account, is that the signs 
comprising thought have objects because they are interpreted as being of 
something by other signs. Without the interpretant, the original sign loses its 
meaning. It is therefore essential that signs come not just as sets of well-formed 
formulae, but as sets that mean by their interrelations. So thoughts, as 
combinatorial, are like sentences, and sentences do not mean anything unless 
they are read and interpreted.  
So it goes for thought. The rationale for the meta-requirement, then, is 
that the condition for a cognition to exist as a cognition is for it to be known to 
exist as such (CP 5.262). As long as there is a problem with nailing down 
whether or not there are intuitions, they are not known to exist. So they don’t. 
Pierce anticipates a familiar regress of analysis problem (an analogue of the 
epistemic regress) in light of this requirement. If we cannot have thoughts 
without signs, then it seems for all interpretations, there must be interpretations 
of them, and then interpretations of them, and we’re off to the races, but this 
time on a semantic or semiotic level.  
Yet Peirce accepts infinitism on this level also, as he notes that the 
alternative requires that there be intuitions that play non-derived inferential 
roles. To hold that there must be such notions “assumes the impossibility of an 
infinite series. But Achilles, as a fact, will overtake the tortoise. How this 
happens, is a question not necessary to be answered at present, as long as it 
certainly does happen” (CP 5.250, emphasis in original). So Peirce is not only 
committed to there being a requirement of infinite analysis, he is committed to 
the thesis that these infinite analyses are actual. Just as Achilles actually catches 
the tortoise, and in so doing traverses an infinity of spaces, we mean and 
reasonably believe, and in so doing, are involved in an infinity of interpretations 
and justifications. The question, despite the fact that Peirce tables it, is how 
exactly this is brought to actuality.  
Let us take Peirce’s analogy with the Achilles case more seriously. One 
of the principles behind the paradox is that Achilles cannot make an infinite 
number of journeys in finite time. But the question with this requirement is why 
not. As the distances become shorter and shorter between Achilles and the 
Tortoise, the time it takes for Achilles to traverse the distance grows 
progressively shorter. As such, the times, instead of stretching out to infinity, 
contract to the limit of Achilles overtaking the tortoise. Time, however, does not 
start and stop with each journey. Neither does Achilles. The question is whether 
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thoughts have the same underlying continuity that time and Achilles’ movement 
have. On Peirce’s model, they do.  
Peirce’s phenomenology provides an account of the continuity of thought 
in interpretation. The levels of sign-interpretation are triadic. First, are 
emotional, atomic, interpretants; second, energetic interpretants; and, third, are 
logical interpretants (CP 5.475). The triadic scheme classifies any object of 
thought, and presumably, thoughts themselves (as they may be objects of 
thought, too). For our purposes, the most useful version of the view is rendered 
in terms of the logic of relations, where the relata stand in one of three kinds of 
irreducible relations: monadic, dyadic, and triadic. For example, some x’s 
redness is monadic, some x bumping into some y is dyadic, and some A giving 
some z to B is triadic.6  
Firsts are simple monadic elements, immediate qualities of feeling, non-
comparative properties. Seconds are actions and reactions, causes and effects, 
the brute force of resistance. As Peirce describes secondness it is that “which the 
rough and tumble of life renders most familiarity prominent. We are continually 
bumping up against hard fact” (CP 1.324). Thirds are lawlike mediated relations. 
Signs and significant behavior are clearly the best candidates, for their status 
requires the relations of who-the-sign-is-for, what-the-sign-is-of, and the sign 
itself. Thoughts themselves, again on the semiotic theory, are thirds, as they 
have their combinatorial elements, but they are interpretations of other thoughts 
and experiences, and for them to mean, they must be interpreted. 
Firsts, as feelings, are the primary constituents of consciousness – they 
are the data that give rise to empirical judgments. They, however, do not 
function as sense-data or immediate objects of awareness. Rather, they are the 
raw fluid material of awareness. Because they are prior to interpretations, we are 
(on Peirce’s theory) not aware of firsts as such. We come to awareness of them 
as discrete seconds – the fact of some quality bearing on us, the world bumping 
back, the resistance of things to our will. Facts impose themselves on us in 
experience, and that pressing is announced with the presence of sensory 
properties. But for us to recognize those facts as such, to understand and make 
inferences on the basis of our experiences, they must be taken as being distinct 
law-like events indicative of their correlate facts (CP 1.420). As such, thirdness 
of thought is the abduction of understanding of what is happening in the world 
on the basis of the secondness of experience. Returning to the analogy with 
Achilles and the tortoise, the distinct movements of thought with thirds depends 
on the fluid movements of awareness in firsts. The continuity of consciousness 
in firstness, however, is the ground for thirds. To see the situation as paradoxical 
is to take thirds to be the antecedent elements. 
Most certainly thirdness is our primary object of interest for 
epistemology, and Peirce’s argument against intuitionism is clearly made on the 
level of thirds. It is only when thoughts are interpreted on this level that they 
may bear inferential relations with each other and are candidates for the meta-
requirement. However, these relations between thirds are not the only 
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epistemically relevant relations. And though firsts solve the problem of the 
continuum, there is a final category that plays an epistemic role.  
Secondness has a place in the Peircean epistemic program, especially if 
we are considering the possible place of non-inferential justification for 
intuitions. If an intuition is a thought that immediately refers to its object, 
instead of looking at the mediacy of reference on the theory of signs, the 
possibility of direct reference may be found in the ontology of the signs 
themselves.  
The place of seconds in the semiotics is the requirement that for thought 
to have the determinant logical content it must have to be the kind of thoughts 
capable of us in a position where we can have knowledge: something must exist, 
there must be something that can be knocked up against, and therefore 
something in consciousness that cannot be thought away. There must be 
something that forces our determinate acknowledgement (CP 2.358). The place 
of secondness in our interpretive triads is that it is a condition not just for the 
being of the objects of our thought, it is a condition for the existence of the 
thoughts themselves: 
 
For as long as things do not act upon one another, there is no sense or 
meaning saying that they have no being, unless it be that they are such in 
themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others (CP 
1.25) 
 
Guy Debrock (1997, 27) has termed this requirement “the Peircean ontological 
principle”: if there is no secondness, there is nothing at all. Thirdness, as habits 
of thought requires that there be occurrences causally suitable to form those 
habits. 
Consequently, thoughts about the seconds that give rise to them are 
themselves referentially direct. A person may say, “I am being appeared to 
thusly” or “He said that the car wouldn’t look like that,” or “Oh, this is how it 
feels to win the race.”7 In making such references, the speakers must be both 
aware of the objects of reference and capable of articulating what such 
references entail. But the awareness of what they are experiencing is not 
provided by their awareness of the context or inferential and practical 
commitments or consequences. They are aware of the causal connection 
between the experiences and their actions. One takes aspirin because headaches 
hurt, not vice versa. These seconds, the pressure of the headache, and its 
correlate effects in our behavior and our beliefs, have a force that we feel and 
articulate with assent to proper descriptions of them. Most certainly there is 
another interpretive element to bringing this force to full belief, but the 
interpretation depends on the material component of the sign for its impetus (CP 
5.292). 
So there is a component of thought, on the Peircean theory, wherein there 
must be non-doxastic support for beliefs. Seconds in experience impel us to 
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formulate commitments. These formulations themselves, on what I’d termed the 
dual role of semiotic interpretation, with causal and epistemic reasons 
functioning in tandem, require further inferences, but the impetus itself is not 
inferential. It is the condition for inference.8 
Peirce’s argument from “Questions” depends on a robust requirement for 
intuition: namely, that the intuition provides justification that itself is 
perspicuous to the subject that has it, and further, that the subject’s justificatory 
status for her beliefs must not only be available to the subject’s reflection, but it 
must be a constitutive component of the belief. From this thought, Peirce derives 
the meta-requirement. The mistake interpretively is to take the requirement 
unqualifiedly to entail the justification assessment must obtain for all intuitive or 
direct epistemic support. Direct support may come in a variety of forms, and 
Peirce’s own semiotic is posited on requiring that some non-inferential support 
function at the heart of the interpretive enterprise. The conception of the 
progress of inquiry itself requires some feature of non-inferential, defeasible 
support:  
 
Besides positive science can only rest on experience; and experience can 
never rest on absolute certainty, exactitude, necessity, or universality (CP 
1.55). 
 
And in the 1903 Harvard lectures, Peirce is clearly committed to the thesis that 
“perceptual judgments are the first premises of all our reasonings” (5.116), and 
that “all our knowledge rests on perceptual judgments” (5.142). Peirce was (at 
least by 1903) committed to there being asymmetric and non-doxastic support, 
but he denied that the criteria for such a role was to be the restricted categories 
arising from the project of refuting skepticism. It does require that if there is 
knowledge, there is non-inferential support. 
However, it seems clear that the argument from the meta-requirement in 
“Questions” and “Consequences” is still in play. Beliefs bearing this indexical 
relation to the seconds from which they arise must still have further beliefs 
mediating their inferential relations with other beliefs. Sensations so far as they 
represent something are determinate according to a logical law by previous 
cognitions (CP 5.291). That we have such and such an experiential event may be 
provided by the index, but what the sensation is of must be provided by the 
event’s relation to other beliefs. We can have direct non-inferential access to our 
experiences as seconds, but for us to know what those experiences are of as 
thirds requires a measure of interpretation.  
We have, then, a model for why Peirce would say that there are no 
intuitions in the sense of first thoughts, ones that do not depend on others for 
their content or justificatory status – for the thoughts to be thoughts, they must 
play be the consequence of inferences. The requirements for justification, 
further, are that premises may function as premises only if they themselves are 
conclusions of further arguments.  
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However, this does not preclude the direct support provided by indexicals 
in experience. In fact, without the secondness of these indexicals, the arguments 
themselves could never be formulated. We make, as Peirce frames the 
alternative to intuitions, “hypothetic inferences from observed facts” (CP 5.260) 
This is not to say that this support is indefeasible. In fact, quite to the contrary – 
the inferences are hypothetic. The support provided by direct justification is 
foundationalist in one way and non-foundationalist in another. In the way it is 
foundationalist, the direct support provided by seconds are brute and give rise to 
the content of interpretants. The support is non-foundationalist in that these 
events enter into consciousness and play the roles they do because they are 
interpreted and the consequences of related inference. Seconds cause us to 
believe things spontaneously, but we arrive at their content by interpretation – 
the beliefs are direct in one way, but indirect in another. 
Peirce’s early theory of justification, then, is committed to two seemingly 
inconsistent theses. On the one hand, there must be an inferential or interpretive 
feature to all epistemic support.10 This drives Peirce’s epistemology in the 
direction of infinitism. On the other hand, there can, and it seems must, be a 
non-doxastic support for premises for them to even exist and be justified at all. 
This drives Peirce’s epistemology back in an empiricist-foundationalist 
direction. The result is the seeming contradiction of on the one hand requiring 
that all justificatory support be inferential but on the other hand allowing 
seconds to justify.  
This contradiction, though, arises only if one takes the theories of sources 
of epistemic justification in tension here to be exclusivist – namely, that if one 
allows in foundationalism or infinitism, one cannot allow in the other. But 
impure theories are non-exclusivist, and it seems that Peirce is working with a 
mixed theory of justification. Seconds may play a role in a series of reasons, but 
on the requirement that they do so in combination of a series of interpretations 
that give seconds epistemic-semiotic significance. By this, our series of 
inferences may also be held accountable to our experience, so that there are 
observational judgments justified by the contents of the experience. One has the 
experiences, and with them, one is justified in having beliefs depending on those 
correlate experiences. But these experiential beliefs do not play a singular role in 
cognitive life, as their relation to other beliefs is mediated by other beliefs. For a 
subject’s belief that she is being appeared to like this to be relevant to her other 
beliefs, the appearance must be interpreted as a representation of something, or 
that it is a symptom of being in some situation that gives rise to certain 
representations.  
Given that all inferential justification is mediated by interpretation, no 
indexical belief about one’s experience (that one is experiencing this) is ever 
sufficient by itself for the justification of another belief, but it may play a role in 
the determination of the other belief’s status (especially if that other belief 
entails that one instead be experiencing that). However, whether or not one has 
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that experience does not depend on other interpretations or inferences, but only 
on the brute fact of experience.  
Peirce explicitly rejects the notion that the regress argument shows that 
there must be a first cognition. His arguments in the 1868 series are precisely 
designed to show that there are not first cognitions, because inference is 
necessary for any cognitive element of life to have semantic or epistemic value. 
However, Peirce also takes himself to have shown how it is possible for 
these series to begin, given this requirement. Peirce shows that cognition arises 
by a process of “unfolding” (CP 5.263) in which the non-inferential material 
features of signs are the explanatory, and eventually justificatory, features for 
cognitions. He notes in the third paper of the 1868 series, “The Ground of 
Validity”:  
 
[I]t does not follow that because there has been no first in a series (of 
premises), therefore that series had no beginning... for the series may be 
continuous, and may have begun gradually... (CP 5.327). 
 
This is to say that the continuity of thought arises less like the beginning of a 
song with a first note, but more like someone progressively turning up the 
volume, and the song fades in. If there were a first thought, it could neither have 
content nor normative status, on the Peircean semiotic. However, thought does 
arise for individuals, and it seems to come about gradually as a whole. Again, 
this is because of the requirements of the semiotic here with the meta-
requirement for first thoughts and the ties between a cognition’s content and its 
epistemic status. The dual role of semiotic interpretation as both causally 
determinative and epistemically justificatory is the locus of this connection. For 
a thought to mean, it must be interpreted. Some interpretations are better than 
others by their responsiveness to the signs and their syntax, and as such, some 
are justified or not. Interpretations have both semiotic-semantic and epistemic 
roles to play. 
One question is which role is conceptually prior. Would Peirce, say, be a 
semiotic infinitist independently of his epistemic infinitism, or vice versa? One 
thought regularly expressed among contemporary epistemologists is that 
epistemological theories cannot be articulated independently of a theory of 
meaning. If we are interested in inferential justification, then some notion of the 
meaning of the variables between the logical functions must be implicated. 
Inference is a semantic notion. A justified inference, then, is a conceptually 
dependent notion – we’ve got to get our semantics nailed down to do 
epistemology properly. 
Peirce’s project is structurally similar – it is Peirce’s semiotic 
commitment that thought must be understood as inferential that yields (a) the 
meta-requirement for intuitions, (b) the intelligibility of a regress of 
interpretations, and (c) the demonstrative relation between thoughts and the 
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seconds that give rise to them. Peircean infinitist epistemology rides piggyback 
to Peircean infinitist semiotics. 
 
3. 
 
The problem is that Peirce’s 1868 semiotics were flawed on three fronts. First, 
Peirce’s theory of indexicals was inadequate to the task. Or, at least, Peirce later 
thought so. All the demonstrative indexes are limited to seconds and thirds in 
consciousness. This leaves Peirce’s semantics incapable of analyzing reference 
to objects in the world.  
Peirce’s case for demonstratives in “Consequences” is that they bear a 
“real physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its 
connection with another sign” (CP 5.287). The question, then, is how these 
connections are established. On Peirce’s semantics, it could only occur as a 
static system of relations between judgments. That is, if intuitions have the meta-
requirement, then demonstratives do too. As a consequence, on the 1868 
Peircean model, there is no escape from the circle of judgments.11 Peirce must 
have realized this problem, as “Fixation” in 1877 has it such that “external 
objects affect our senses according to regular laws, and that we may, on the 
basis of this knowledge, come to know them.” (CP 5.384). The mediacy of 
judgments and interpretations of knowledge of things other than judgments had 
been dropped for a causal theory of reference.12 Given that Peirce embraced 
infinitism on the basis of the requirement for interpretive mediacy for reference, 
his later acceptance of such reference seems to withdraw motivation from taking 
the view on. Peirce still could have been an infinitist in the 1877–78 papers 
(“Fixation” and “How to Make our Ideas Clear”) and later, but he had no 
positive reason to be so. 
Second, Peirce would also have had to explain how demonstrative 
reference to seconds provides epistemic support. Insofar as Peirce’s require-
ments for support run that only inference can provide support, it seems that 
Peirce’s theory may suffer from a familiar dilemma: either the demonstrative 
reference is cognitive or it isn’t. If it is cognitive, then it must be so because it 
has been interpreted. If so, then it cannot provide epistemic justification (since 
that status is possible only if it is conferred by a further cognitive state). If the 
reference is not cognitive, then it cannot provide support, because it cannot 
function in inference.13  
So long as Peirce is committed to the requirement that inference is the 
sole means of support, then it is still unclear how seconds may justify any other 
state. They may cause them (which is how they arise), but without the 
inferential-interpretive component, they cannot, on Peirce’s requirements, play 
an epistemic role. This, again, is a consequence of what I earlier termed the dual 
role of semiotic interpretation as both causally determinative of content and 
epistemically justifying. It seems with seconds, we have a question as to how the 
epistemic element arises without further inferences. 
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The third problem is that it is unclear how Peirce’s account of 
interpretation in the 1868 essays has anything to do with truth. We know that 
signs, in order to mean, must be interpreted by other signs. But we have no 
criteria for what a correct or incorrect interpretation is. Peirce must be 
committed to this difference, as it is crucial to save his theory that all thought is 
modeled on valid inference (CP 6.338). He explains cases of fallacious 
reasoning as cases where one misinterprets or confuses a rule of inference, and 
thereby uses the wrong one (CP 5.282).  
But what is this notion of misinterpretation? On the semiotic theory, 
inferences and content of the thoughts they move from are established by other 
inferences. How, then, could they be distinct from the wrong ones, since ex 
hypothesi they are both logically determinate enough to be cognitively 
significant? If it is a brute fact of the matter which is right, then there are 
components of consciousness that have their cognitive contents independently of 
interpretation. The theory of seconds earlier is supposed to explain how 
interpretations come about, but it is silent on whether those interpretations are 
correct or incorrect. Consequently, if the 1868 theory is to be salvable, a more 
robust theory of seconds is necessary. 
A closing question is whether another Peircean epistemic infinitism could 
be abstracted from the model for inquiry and truth that is incipient in the 1868 
articles: 
 
[T]he real ... consists of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the 
community will always continue to re-affirm (CP 5.312). 
 
And the theory runs through the later work (1901): 
 
Truth is that accordance of the abstract statement with the ideal limit 
towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific beliefs 
(CP 5.565). 
 
The problem for such a model for the purposes of epistemic infinitism is that it 
underdetermines the theory of justification necessary for the task. Let us take the 
theory of reality and truth here on an ideal convergence model of infinitely 
extended investigation. This is admittedly a contentious interpretation. However, 
if we do not take the model as requiring infinite investigation, there is clearly no 
tie to epistemic infinitism. The question is whether epistemic infinitism can be 
tied to the theory of truth as interpreted as requiring infinite inquiry. If the 
theory of truth articulated here is not a convergence theory, then it will not 
support an infinitist epistemology. That seems clear. However, if the 
convergence theory of truth is right, the question is what follows for Peirce’s 
epistemology? 
On the model of ideal convergence of infinite inquiry, does epistemic 
infinitism follow? The answer is that endless investigation does not mean 
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infinite series of justifying inferences. Endless investigation of a proposition’s 
truth, at any time, may change which other propositions are in the series, change 
their order, or add new inferences. Or it may reveal that the series does not 
provide the requisite support for p by defeating some branch necessary for p’s 
justification. Or it may add new nodes to the series infinitely, so that the series 
may stretch to infinity. But there is nothing to the notion of infinitely extended 
inquiry that means that the series of justificatory inferences it yields are infinite 
or otherwise.  
Endless inquiry, I believe, is reflective of the fallibilist component of 
Peirce’s epistemology and its requirement of revisability. The notion of truth at 
the end of endless inquiry is more a model for an ethic of well-regulated inquiry 
than a model for epistemic justification, infinitist or not. We may be justified 
now, but that does not make our beliefs immune to correction when new 
information comes in. We may be open to infinite iterations of correction and 
revision, but such a structure itself does not require that the supporting reasons 
be infinite. In this respect, Peirce’s later theory of inquiry may be called 
epistemically infinitist, because his epistemology does not rule out the 
possibility of infinitely extended chains of inferences, but such an infinitism (as 
opposed to his views in 1868) is hardly explicit enough to merit little more than 
a qualified attribution of the view. The later view is, on what’s given, consistent 
with infinitism, but hardly an endorsement. 
Peirce was an infinitist in his early work, namely in the 1868 series of 
articles in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. I’ve argued that the infinitism 
may be understood on what I’ve termed impure infinitism. However, Peirce’s 
infinitism was held on the basis of a flawed semiotic theory. Peirce himself later 
recognized these defects, and in correcting them, it seems he also took leave of 
the epistemic view. In any case, he no longer felt it necessary to explicitly 
endorse it.  
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NOTES 
 
1. Peter Klein makes a case for this reading of Sextus in 2004. See Sextus’ use of 
the regress horn of the Agrippan modes (PH I.168). 
2. References to Peirce’s Collected Works will be designated: (CP, Volume #, 
p#). 
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3. Klein and Fantl use different criteria for their arguments. Klein’s requirements 
are those of non-arbitrariness and non-circularity (1999, 222), and Fantl’s are 
intelligibility of complete and degreed justification (2003, 538). 
4. See Davis (1972, 8) for an account of the meta-requirement. Note, also, that 
this requirement is analogous to the Pyrrhonean requirement for regress-ending 
hypotheses (PH 164–177) and also has found other forms in BonJour’s meta-
justifications argument (1985, 30–33), and have figured widely in response to 
foundationalism. See Oakley (1976, 222–223), Possin and Timmons (1989, 206) and 
Klein (1999, 277–279). 
5. It seems though, that if Peirce is willing to accept the first order level with the 
regress, then why should a regress of intuitions be objectionable at the second order? 
Couldn’t it be intuitive that it is intuitive that ... that it is intuitive that p? So long as 
intuition functions, for those who have them, as transparent (i.e., that one simply grasps 
the content, not the embedding), such embeddings would not be an issue. 
6. See Cheryl Misak’s discussion of Peirce’s categories (2004, 22). 
7. See Peirce’s discussion of pure demonstrative applications of thought-signs 
(CP 5.296). 
8. Cf. Delaney (1993, 89 and 111–118) who takes this point as indicative of a 
weak foundationalism in Peirce’s early works. 
9. This strategy is noted by Floridi (1997, 54), who extends Perice’s response to 
skeptics as an argument for convergent realism. 
10. See CP 5.318 for Perice’s explicit endorsement of this thesis. 
11. See Thompson (1978, 79) and de Waal (1996, 436) for versions of this 
problem for Peirce’s early semantics. 
12. Hookway (2002, 18 and 29–30) notes this difference and attributes Peirce’s 
change of mind to Royce’s influence. See also Short (2004) for an account of the 
development of Peirce’s semiotics and theory of indexes. 
13. Versions of this familiar dilemma can be found in Sellars (1963, 146–147), 
Davidson (1986, 311), Rorty (1979, 95–96), and BonJour (1985, 69) 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aikin, Scott F. 2005. “Who’s Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?” Philosophical  
Studies 126: 191–217. 
 
Aikin, Scott F. 2008. “Meta-epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism.” 
Synthese 163.2 (July): 175–185.  
 
BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
BonJour, Laurence. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, 
Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Chisholm, Roderick. 1977. Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism 
 
85
Clark, Romane. 1988. “Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments.” Philosophical Perspectives 
2: Epistemology 1988: 369–380. 
 
Cling, Andrew. 2004. “The Trouble with Infinitism.” Synthese 138.1 (January): 101–123. 
 
Cornman, James. 1977. “Foundational versus Non-foundational Theories of Empirical 
Justification.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 287–297. 
 
Cortens, Andrew. 2002. “Foundationalism and the Regress Argument.” Disputatio 12: 
22–36. 
 
Davidson, Donald. 1986. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in Truth and 
Interpretation, ed. Ernest Leplore (New York: Blackwell), pp. 307–319. 
 
Davis, William H. 1972. Peirce’s Epistemology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Debrock, Guy. 1997. “Perice’s Category of Secondness and Information,” in C. S. 
Peirce: Categories to Constantinople, ed. Jaap van Brakel and Michael van Heerden 
(Belgium: Leuven University Press), pp. 31–46. 
 
Deutscher, Max. 1973. “Regresses, Reasons, and Grounds.” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 51: 1–16. 
 
Delaney, C. F. 1993. Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. 
Peirce. South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press. 
 
De Waal, Cornelis. 1996. “The Real Issue between Nominalism and Realism, Peirce and 
Berkeley Reconsidered.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32: 425–441. 
 
Fantl, Jeffrey. 2003. “Modest Infinitism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 537–562. 
 
Floridi, Luciano. 1997. “The Importance of Being Earnest: Skepticism and the Limits of  
Fallibilism in Peirce,” in C.S. Peirce: Categories to Constantinople, ed. Jaap van Brakel  
and Michael van Heerden (Belgium: Leuven University Press), pp. 47–60. 
 
Foley, Richard. 1978. “Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress.” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 15: 311–316. 
 
Haack, Susan. 1993. Evidence and Inquiry. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Hookway, Christopher. 2002. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Klein, Peter. 1999. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” 
Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology 1999: 297–325. 
 
Klein, Peter. 2000. “Why not Infinitism?” in Proceedings of the Twentieth World 
Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 5, ed. Richard Cobb-Stevens (Bowling Green, Ohio: 
Philosophy Documentation Center), pp. 199–208. 
SCOTT F. AIKEN 
 
86
Klein, Peter. 2004. “There is no Good Reason to be an Academic Skeptic,” in Essential 
Knowledge, ed. Steven Luper (New York: Pearson-Longman), pp. 299–309. 
 
McGrew, Timothy. 1995. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, Md.: Littlefield 
Adams. 
 
Misak, Cheryl. 2004. “Charles Sanders Peirce,” in The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, 
ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Moser, Paul. 1985. “Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification?” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 23: 65–74. 
 
Oakley, I. T. 1976. “An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Belief.” American  
Philosophical Quarterly 13: 221–228. 
 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, 8 vols., ed. 
Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
 
Pollock, John. 1974. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Possin, Kevin and Mark Timmons. 1989. “What’s Wrong with Paul Moser’s 
Intuitionistic Foundationalism.” Philosophical Studies 56: 199–208. 
 
Post, John. 1980. “Infinite Regresses of Justification and Explanation.” Philosophical 
Studies 38: 32–50. 
 
Post, John. 1987. Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics. Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
 
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1963. Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press. 
 
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. (PH) 
 
Short. Thomas L. 2004. “Peirce’s Theory of Signs,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Sosa, Ernest. 1974. “How Do You Know?” American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 113–
122. 
 
Thompson, Manley. 1978. “Peirce’s Verificationist Realism.” Review of Metaphysics 32: 
74–98. 
 
 
Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism 
 
87
Scott F. Aikin 
Lecturer in Philosophy 
111 Furman Hall 
Vanderbilt University 
Nashville, TN 37240  
United States 
 
 
 
 
